This paper has three objectives: (1) to construct a theoretical model that aids in evaluating marketing expertise, (2) to use that theoretical model to identify factors influencing the Value of marketing expertise, and (3) to empirically test the model by observing how different market conditions influence whether companies emphasize marketing expertise. We accomplish these objectives as follows.
Introduction
Marketing's role has evolved from simply enhancing demand for the factory's current output to being a critical part of the strategic planning process. Using market information, defining market segments, and target marketing are now crucial components of the business plan (Webster 1988) . Marketing expertise helps a firm make better marketing decisions that can improve the performance and profitability of the firm.
PA §A AND SHUGAN The Value of Marketing Expertise
Some firms place less value on marketing expertise. This evaluation appears to depend on firm and market factors 1 (Houston 1986 , Kohli and Jaworski 1990 , Levitt 1983 . A recent Forbes magazine article (Simon and But ton 1990 ) provides a clear example of the contrast that exists across industries:
"The heart and soul of competing is knowing how to appeal to your customers. If you can't provide the products they really want, you won't succeed." Donald Petersen, Chairperson, Ford Motor Company "Companies have to improve not only the quality of their prod ucts but the quality of the process by which their products are designed and built. . . Companies and universities gave very little attention to the technology of manufacturing." Frank Schrontz, Chairperson, Boeing Corporation
Ford Motor Company espouses marketing expertise, while Boeing Corporation stresses production expertise. Unfortunately, as Kohli and Jaworski (1990) report, no theory exists for explaining this distinction and predict ing which firm and market factors should influence the relative value of marketing expertise. Possible factors are numerous, ranging from industry characteristics (such as concentration and scale economies) to firm size and productivity. Capon et al. (1990) list over 175 fac tors considered by 320 different studies as determinants of financial performance. Moreover, there is no consen sus on predicted relationships. For example, in their survey, Kohli and Jaworski (1990) find that marketing is more valuable in industries with greater competition. However, greater competition also requires cost cutting and more efficient manufacturing (Levitt 1983) , which makes production more valuable. Without a theoretical model it is difficult to sort out the many factors and reconcile the different views.
A theoretical model or framework could identify the factors that determine the relative priority of marketing expertise. Identification and comprehension of these factors are important (Narver and Slater 1990) . They are the foundation of any strategic plan. In this paper, we 1 Note that the impact of firm and market factors on the success of various marketing tactics is well recognized in the literature (Boulding and Staelin 1990, Gatignon et al. 1990 ). However, their impact on the effectiveness of marketing expertise is more controversial.
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE/Vol. 42, No. 3, March 1996 provide a theoretical and empirical model for approach ing this problem. This paper has three objectives. First, we want to con struct a theoretical model that aids in evaluating mar keting expertise. Second, we want to use that theoretical model to identify factors influencing the value of mar keting expertise. Third, we want to empirically test the model.
Our model provides guidelines about when a firm should invest in marketing expertise. We identify some conditions that increase the value of marketing exper tise. Our model helps a firm analyze whether it should invest more or less in marketing expertise given its cur rent environmental conditions. This analysis is espe cially critical when the environment is changing; the fu ture may require rethinking the role of different func tions.
To provide a framework for finding the value of mar keting expertise, we rely on the well-established area of decision analysis (Bernoulli 1738 , Eliashberg and Winkler 1981 , Keeney 1982 , Luce and Raffia 1957 , Schlaifer 1959 ). We do not, however, use decision analysis in the normative tradition (Eliashberg and Hauser 1985) of prescribing behavior. We do not assume that firms ac tually use formal decision analysis. Rather, we allow firms to be rational profit maximizers. We only use de cision theory to describe their actions. Given that as sumption, we predict how firms should evaluate mar keting expertise. Understanding that marketing deals with information, we can link the value of marketing expertise to the expected value of information using a decision-theoretical model.
Section 2 presents the model and derives a theoretical expression for the value of marketing expertise. We use decision theory quaUtatively for directional effects rather than computing specific dollar values. For ex ample, we show that the value of marketing expertise increases as market instability increases.
Section 3 translates this expression to specific observ able firm and market factors. This task is difficult be cause we want specific measures beyond qualitative fac tors. Here, decision theory provides less guidance. Given this problem, we proceed in two phases. First, we take the mathematical expression for the expected value of perfect marketing expertise and derive qualitative implications. These become our propositions. Second, we determine observable measures for those ramifica tions. Here, we use measures and relationships suggested by micro-economic theory (e.g., competition decreases profits) and strategy literature (e.g., market advantage means higher earnings). These become our hypotheses.
Section 4 empirically tests our hypotheses using data from 592 different firms. Our empirical analysis shows that certain factors do make marketing expertise more valuable to a firm. Greater market instability and mar ket presence increase the value of marketing expertise while larger organization size, organization instability, and competition decrease its value.
The paper ends with managerial implications and suggestions for future research.
Theory and Model
We define marketing expertise as the ability to make better marketing decisions. Of course, decision-making is only one part of marketing management (GomezMejia et al. 1985 , Steers et al. 1985 , Whitley 1985 . How ever, decision-making is an important part of manage ment (Bunn 1984 , Keeney 1982 , Winkler 1972 , Urban and Star 1991 .
The literature often emphasizes improving decisions with the use of data. Although data are important, data often require interpretation. In fact, the two are insep arable. For example, consider medical expertise. A phy sician examines a patient collecting both physical and verbal data concerning the patient's condition. Medical expertise allows the physician to ignore some data while emphasizing other data to form a diagnosis. Without medical expertise, we could be misled by ob vious symptoms and could overlook less obvious, but critical, information necessary for a correct diagnosis.
We argue that marketing expertise creates better de cisions by providing interpreted market data. Hence, expertise creates information from data by adding in terpretation. Beyond interpreting data, expertise also fil ters information and determines which information to collect. Hence, as marketing information becomes more important for firm decisions, the value of marketing ex pertise increases. We conclude that measuring the value of market information also provides a measure of the value of marketing expertise.
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If the value of market information measures the value of marketing expertise, then decision analysis provides an established method for measuring the value of mar keting expertise. Decision analysis (Bernoulli 1738 , Bunn 1984 , Chernoff and Moses 1959 , Keeney 1982 , Luce and Raffia 1957 , Raiffa 1968 , Schlaifer 1959 , Wink ler and Hays 1975 , Winkler 1972 ) is one of few theories for precisely defining the value of market information. Although this definition is limited to decision-making, the definition is precise. The value of marketing infor mation is the difference between the expected value of decision outcomes with and without that information. The value of information or expertise becomes the in cremental expected benefit that expertise provides. So the expected impact of marketing information on firm decision-making determines the value of marketing ex pertise.
Classical decision analysis assumes that data resolve or lessen uncertainty. We assume data alone are equiv ocal. Determining whether a new product will succeed, for example, requires marketing expertise allowing in terpretation of market research data. By requiring ex pertise, we allow two firms facing identical market data to take different strategies based solely on interpretation or available expertise. Marketing information is more valuable when it allows the firm to make better deci sions. Marketing information is less valuable when it has little impact on the firm's decisions.
Consider a simple example. Consider taking a partic ular marketing strategy in an uncertain world that could be in two states: receptive or unreceptive to the strategy. Although we expect the world is receptive, we may be mistaken, and the strategy could be wrong. The follow ing formula provides the incremental expected benefit of knowing the true state-of-the-world (i.e., perfect mar keting expertise).
value of probability profit from outcome from marketing = of being X best alternatewrong expertise mistaken strategy strategy
Here, the value of marketing expertise depends on three factors: (1) the probability of a mistake; (2) the profit impact from alternate strategies, i.e., strategies not taken without marketing expertise; and (3) the potential loss from a mistake. Moreover, the value of nonmarketing expertise would be influenced by similar factors such as the loss from an incorrect production strategy. In sum, we equate the value of marketing expertise to the value of market information.
Our reasoning is consistent with the contemporary view that marketing provides the primary interface be tween the market and the firm in an exchange process (Bagozzi 1975; Kotler 1972 Kotler ,1984 Houston 1986 ). How ever, we make a fundamental modification to this idea. Rather than considering the complete role of marketing, perhaps an impossible task, we focus on the manage ment or decision-making functions involved in this exchange. We model these decisions using decision the ory. Decision theory provides a tractable model with precise and testable implications.
Within this model, firms decide among different mar keting strategies. The decision uses specific marketing expertise or information. In our model, a firm can invest only in two types of expertise, marketing and nonmar keting. To some extent, nonmarketing expertise is an opportunity cost for marketing expertise (i.e., to invest in marketing expertise, the firm forgoes some invest ment in nonmarketing expertise). Marketing experts, for example, can have a greater or smaller degree of influence on top corporate decisions. This is true for every type of expertise (e.g., legal, ecological, etc.).
Within a decision-theoretic model, information par titions the strategy space (Marschak and Radner 1972) . Hence, marketing information is valuable only for choosing a strategy. This is a simplification. Marketing information may be valuable for purposes other than choosing a strategy. For example, marketing informa tion can help managers gain the critical internal support and consensus that are necessary for the success of a marketing strategy.
Here, we have a set T t of marketing strategies (Mar schak and Radner 1972). We define the strategy space vector i as follows.
L = the vector of marketing strategies, L, = marketing strategy i, i € T t . Each marketing strategy is complex and includes many individual decisions. For example, t] could be a shrink/niche strategy, t 2 could be a market growth strategy, and t 3 could be a hold/reposition strategy. Each strategy implies different decisions regarding new MANAGEMENT SCIENCE/VOI. 42, No. 3, March 1996 product introductions, advertising, distribution, pric ing, sales force deployment, and so on. The appropriate strategy depends on the true state-of-the-world. Differ ent states often favor one strategy over another. Mar keting expertise seeks to determine the true state by in terpreting data on buyer preferences, buyer percep tions, past competitive actions, and so on. Marketing expertise, therefore, can change the firm's subjective probability of particular outcomes.
For nonmarketing expertise, we have a set r^ of nonmarketing strategies. Obviously, this strategy space in cludes strategies in many different areas involving pro duction, finance, personnel, and so on.
</ * = the vector of nonmarketing strategies, tp k = nonmarketing strategy k, k € 1^. Sometimes marketing and nonmarketing activities are difficult to separate. Producing a particular product design may involve knowledge of both the market and the firm's manufacturing capabilities, suggesting a multidisciplinary approach (Child 1977 , Duncan 1979 , Mintzberg 1979 , Randolph and Dess 1984 . However, empirical experience (Coggin 1974 , Daft and Steers 1986 , Duncan 1979 , Springmier 1982 is consistent with having a distinct set i/». Clear functional areas still exist in most organizations.
With current marketing expertise, the firm chooses a corporate strategy (t,, tf/ k More marketing expertise places a higher probability on correctly identifying the true A-state. More nonmarketing expertise places a higher probability on correctly identifying the true i//-state.
Note the relationship between the strategy space and the state-of-the-world. Given a particular state-of-the world (I fc , \P"), and a particular strategy (A,, ijf k ), the firm would receive a payoff, II((A,, >p k ), {I h , ^")). We do not specify an explicit form for the firm's profit function. Nonetheless, we note that interaction effects between marketing and nonmarketing strategies can be impor tant (Eliashberg and Steinberg 1987 , Hauser and Claus ing 1988 , Shapiro 1988 , Zirger and Madique 1990 , and should be explored in future studies. However, incor porating these interactions adds little to the objective of our analysis and greatly complicates the notation.
The primary objective, in decision analysis, is to max imize the expected payoff. 4 Payoffs, of course, depend
1 The states-of-the-world in each state space are assumed to be collec tively exhaustive (i.e., one of the states-of-the-world is bound to occur). For tractability, we make a simplification and assume discrete state sets in each state space. 4 In the literature, this is known as maximizing expected monetary value (EMV), as introduced by Schlaifer (1959) . Another objective can be maximizing expected utility, where monetary values are replaced with the corresponding utilities of the decision maker. The solution stays the same as long as the conditional utility is linear in money (i.e., risk neutral). In cases of nonlinear utility (i.e., risk averse or risk lover), cer tainty monetary equivalent (CME) can be used instead of utility. This allows two firms (e.g., a small firm and a large firm) with different levels of risk aversion to choose different strategies when faced with the same prospect. Eliashberg and Chatterjee (1985) suggest the use of group utility functions.
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on the true state-of-the-world. Having expertise is equivalent to having information or knowledge about the true state. Perfect expertise, for example, would re veal the actual state-of-the-world. If we expect, for example, that the world is receptive to a niche strategy and we are wrong, our payoff is lower. Suppose marketing expertise reveals that the true state is more receptive to a growth strategy. The value of marketing expertise is the difference between the payoffs from a growth strategy and a niche strategy (in a world favoring growth). Multiplying the difference in payoffs by the probability that the true state favors a growth strategy yields the expected value of marketing expertise.
We define marketing expertise as the ability to create, and correctly interpret, information about I h . That in formation might include market research, past trends in sales, and likely competitive reactions. Marketing ex pertise increases the firm's subjective probability for the true state-of-the-world. We see that marketing expertise affects the firm's expectations.
The firm has an expectation regarding the likelihood that each state //, is true. We represent this likelihood with a probability pidi,)-Remember there is no true probability. One state is true with certainty. The prob ability p, (I h ) reflects the firm's beliefs about which state is true. Hence, the firm believes state I h is true with prob ability pidh). If the firm takes action i ir it expects payoff IK A,-, I h ) with probability pi(I h )-Hence, a risk-neutral firm chooses the strategy A* that maximizes expected profits as shown in equation (5);
L% = the optimal marketing strategy given current marketing expertise, p,(I h ) = the probability of state I h , reflecting the firm's expectations given current marketing expertise.
Equation (6) defines IK A*):
IKA*) = X P/(4)IKi*, /"), where
IK I*) = the expected payoff of optimal marketing strategy given current marketing expertise.
Here, IK A*) represents the firm's expected payoff given the current beliefs of the firm, pAW, with current PA §A AND SHUGAN The Value of Marketing Expertise marketing expertise. Although the decision-analysis model considers a stochastic world, only one outcome occurs. The beliefs, depicted by piUi,), only reflect the uncertainty held by the decision-maker.
Hence, despite pAh), the strategy i* will, with cer tainty, lead to a precise payoff Il t (t # , I T ). In fact, every strategy t, leads to a precise outcome. Equation (7) de fines the strategy t* (I h ) that maximizes the payoff for any given state I h :
i L*{I h ) = the optimal marketing strategy given the state I h .
We define perfect marketing expertise as the ability to detect the true t-state, 5 I T . Of course, we could define imperfect expertise that leads to improved decisions with less than perfect knowledge about I T . Using im perfect expertise greatly complicates the development while adding little insight. Moreover, perfect marketing expertise allows us to benchmark the value of imperfect expertise.
If the firm acquires perfect marketing expertise, it will know the true state-of-the-world I T . It can then choose strategy L*(I T ) and receive the payoff rX(t*(/ r ), I T )-Now the actual value of marketing expertise is the difference in payoffs between perfect and current expertise given the true state. So the value of marketing expertise is
Y1AL*(I T ), h) ~ TIM; h)-
Unfortunately, computing this quantity is impossible because the firm makes a decision whether to acquire marketing expertise, before learning the true state I T . The firm only learns I T after acquiring perfect marketing expertise. This creates a dilemma. Although firms can not compute the value of marketing expertise, they can compute the expected value of marketing expertise. Us ing the firm's expectations before acquiring marketing expertise, i.e., pi(I h ), they compute the likelihood that expertise identifies each state I h as the true state I T . The expected payoff of perfect marketing expertise follows. See equation (8):
IX = the expected payoff given perfect marketing ex pertise. Equation (9) provides the expected value of marketing:
where h<E<ti (8) EVME = the expected value of perfect marketing ex pertise.
Equation (9) provides a theoretical measure for the expected value of marketing expertise. Note that we de viate slightly from the decision-analysis literature by in troducing the concept of expertise. Within the decisionanalysis model, only information is important. Here, we consider information as consisting of both the data and the ability to interpret those data. By adding the notion of interpretation, we allow two firms facing identical data to take different strategies based solely on mana gerial judgment.
We conclude this section with two comments about the expected value of marketing expertise. First, EVME represents perfect expertise in marketing. In reality, we may never find perfect expertise. Like most invest ments, investment in expertise will exhibit diminishing marginal returns. It is too costly to obtain perfect ex pertise. Obviously, imperfect marketing expertise might lead to strategies with outcomes less desirable than IX(i*(J T ), I T ), but still more desirable than IXCt*). Here, it is important to place conditions on the probability distribution p : so that the expected value of the strategy increases as expertise increases. To simplify the expo sition, we only consider the case of complete expertise.
Second, EVME will be difficult to measure without experimentation. Fortunately, we do not need to mea sure it directly. Our objective is to find the factors in creasing or decreasing the expected value of marketing expertise. The definition of EV t (t*) helps us identify these factors.
Propositions and Hypotheses
Equation (9) provides a theoretical measure for the ex pected value of perfect marketing expertise. We know from equation (9) that, ceteris paribus, as n t (i # ) de creases, the expected value of marketing expertise in creases. Substituting from equation (6) and equation (8) into equation (9), and rearranging, we obtain equation (10) for the expected value of perfect marketing exper tise:
However, it is more meaningful to consider the ex pected value of perfect marketing expertise after ad justing for the scale of operations.
6 Equation (11) if/* = the optimal nonmarketing strategy given cur rent nonmarketing expertise, ?*(*") = the probability of Vt-state n that reflects the firm's expectations given current non-marketing exper tise, Hf,(i^t, \I/") = the payoff from nonmarketing strategy ifi k in state *&", 6 The decision theoretic framework looks at the Expected Value of Per fect Marketing Expertise in terms of its absolute magnitude. Thus, the Expected Value of Perfect Marketing Expertise increases as the scale of operations increases. If a firm merely doubled in size (sales) while maintaining the same profitability (profit/sales), the Expected Value of Perfect Marketing Expertise would double. Scaling by sales avoids this problem (Associate Editor). «^*(\E' ") = the optimal nonmarketing strategy given the true state as \l>".
Equation (11) provides three conditions affecting the expected value of perfect marketing expertise scaled by sales, EVMEU:
(1) When fi(I h ) approaches one for some state h, EVMEU decreases.
Equation (11) provides us with three propositions. Each proposition suggests a testable hypothesis. Note that the relationships, given in equation (11), are multivariate. Therefore, each condition is true, ceteris paribus (i.e., each condition is true holding all other influencing variables constant). We now discuss these propositions and the corresponding hypotheses.
To test the propositions, we must translate these theo retical constructs into measurable variables. This task is difficult because decision theory provides little guid ance concerning what factors should increase or de crease p 7 (4).
Given this problem, we proceed in two phases. First, we take each of the three mathematical conditions for the EVMEU and derive a corresponding qualitative ramification. These become our propositions. Second, we find observable measures for those ramifications. Here, we use measures and relationships suggested by micro-economic theory (e.g., competition decreases profits) and the strategy literature (e.g., market advan tage spawns higher earnings) to create testable hypoth eses. We hope our two-phase approach begins to ad dress this difficult problem.
Consider condition 1. This condition says that when the market is turbulent (e.g., many possible t-states) and forecasting is difficult (e.g., many equally likely istates), there is a greater need for market expertise. Of course, forecasting is simpler when the market is un changing. For example, suppose the market exists in 7 Condition 3 follows from the fact that when the probability of some state approaches one, the optimal strategy with current expertise be comes identical to the optimal strategy with perfect expertise (i.e., when piU k ) -1 for some k € $/, t» s t**(Jjc) and EVi(t»)/S = 0). See the appendix for proof of Condition 1. There are many indicators of market instability. Of ten, market stability simplifies prediction while rapid change makes prediction more difficult. Very stable product categories, for example, reduce instability by lessening the chance of radical change. New products, however, create many possible outcomes (many new tstates), and these outcomes are less predictable. New products can shift demand for existing products, change purchasing patterns, transpose category size, and en courage additional innovations. Moreover, observing new products also suggests exogenous changes in the market such as new firm entry, changing demographics, changing customer needs, and new buyers in the market.
In markets with many new products, predicting sales is more difficult and complex (Urban and Hauser 1980) be cause past trends no longer predict the future. Buyers may shift to new products. This shift, however, is difficult to predict because many buyers may be unaware of new products and awareness may change over time. More over, before shifts take place, additional new products may enter and again change the dynamics of the market.
Most marketing textbooks (e.g., Urban and Hauser 1980) note that forecasting (i.e., t-states) in markets with new products is far more difficult because of these fac tors. New products create, and sometimes reflect, changing markets. Hence, regardless of whether new products cause or follow market change, the need for marketing expertise should increase. 8 Note that uncertainty is a state of managers' minds, and it is a func tion of the environment and its interpretation (Reviewer B). Equation (12) implies that, controlling for the scale of operations, the need for nonmarketing expertise in creases as nonmarket instability increases. Just as exter nal market instability increases the need for marketing expertise, internal organization instability increases the need for nonmarketing expertise (Dewar and Hage 1978) . For example, rapid growth (or dramatic down sizing) creates organization instability and the need for nonmarketing expertise involving hiring, restructuring, training, contracting, operations, support functions, and so on. Despite the reason, such changes require more nonmarketing expertise. Hence, we expect firms that are making large changes in their labor forces to place a high value on nonmarketing expertise. Hypothesis lb* follows:
HYPOTHESIS IB*. Controlling for the scale of operations, firms with greater organization instability {e.g., large changes in number of employees) have a greater need for nonmarketing expertise to manage this instability.
Top management skills should reflect both marketing and nonmarketing expertise. In some environments, their expertise should be mainly marketing. In other en vironments, nonmarketing expertise should be domi nant. When a resource constraint exists on total exper tise (marketing plus nonmarketing), then increasing nonmarketing expertise requires a reduction in market ing expertise. Conceptually, firms maximize profits that depend on levels of marketing and nonmarketing ex pertise, given a resource constraint on total (marketing plus nonmarketing) expertise. When the constraint is binding, then marketing expertise declines at the mar gin as nonmarketing expertise becomes more impor tant.
9 With unconstrained resources, the proportion of expertise still depends on the relative importance of marketing and nonmarketing expertise. Hypothesis lb follows. A distinct market advantage usually generates greater profit potential for the firm (Day and Wesley 1988 , Carroll 1982 , Porter 1980 . A superior market per formance, such as large market share or high profitabil ity, controlling for the scale of operations, demonstrates some market advantage (Day and Wensley 1988 It is also possible to measure TI t (-, •) indirectly by examining market competition. Economic theory sug gests that firm profits decrease as market competition increases. Generally, economic theory suggests that firms have less marginal return to marketing activities as competition increases (Hauser and Shugan 1983) .
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Also, greater competition requires more nonmarketing expertise for making the organization and production processes more efficient because prices become the driv ing force in the industry (Levitt 1983 Proposition 3 represents traditional downside risk or the potential loss from a marketing mistake. If the firm's current strategy, i*, is greatly inferior in the true state l T , or other possible states, there is a substantial poten tial loss from the firm's current strategy t*. Of course, the firm chooses L# because these disastrous states seem unlikely. It is exactly this situation that greatly increases the value of marketing expertise. Marketing expertise insures against these unlikely but disastrous states.
Consider, for example, Coca Cola changing the for mula associated with its flagship cola brand. This change risks enormous brand-name capital. A small share loss could generate substantial losses in profit. If a firm has a greater market share or market presence, the firm has more to lose from marketing mistakes. For this reason, firms are very careful who they select to run their "bread-and-butter" business units.
Thus, when the potential loss (e.g., Tl£i*Q. h ), l h )/ TLXt*, l h )) is larger, ceteris paribus, marketing expertise is more valuable. The ratio Yl t (t-*(lh), W/riXi*, h) is large, controlling for the scale of operations, when the firm's current strategy, without marketing expertise, 10 One can also take the opposing view and argue that, especially for noncommodity-type products, just as efficient organization and pro duction help lower cost, effective marketing can help raise prices and profits by differentiating the product (Associate Editor). These oppos ing views on the impact of competition on the value of marketing expertise will be resolved by the empirical analyses. Similar to Proposition 3, Equation (12) implies that, controlling for the scale of operations, nonmarketing ex pertise is more valuable when the performance of the firm's current nonmarketing strategy i/»# could be sig nificantly inferior to the performance potential of the best nonmarketing strategy <p* with perfect nonmarket ing expertise. Greater market presence might imply the need for a larger organization (e.g., larger assets, more employees, more departments, etc.). Controlling for the scale of operations, larger organization size could also imply greater losses from a mistake. With greater po tential losses from organization mistakes, emphasis on management of the organization implies a greater value for nonmarketing expertise (Daft and Steers 1986) . Hy pothesis 3b* follows.
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HYPOTHESIS 3B*. Controlling for the scale of operations, firms with larger organization size (e.g., larger assets) have a greater need for nonmarketing expertise to manage the larger organization.
As the value of nonmarketing expertise increases, the relative value of marketing expertise decreases. Hence, Hypothesis 3b follows:
HYPOTHESIS 3B. Controlling for the scale of operations, firms with larger organization size (e.g., larger assets) have a smaller need for marketing expertise.
Note that we can find many good measures of orga nization size other than the size of assets. It is also pos sible to assess the need for nonmarketing expertise with measures other than organization size. Fortunately, other measures that we explored were highly correlated with the reported measures. Therefore, our reported measures seem to capture the underlying factoT. How ever, we need future research to study in detail the types of nonmarketing expertise and additional measures for each type.
Note that each proposition has a direct measure (Hy potheses 3a) and an indirect measure (Hypothesis 3b). The indirect measure corresponds to the expected value of marketing expertise relative to non-marketing exper tise. Hence, nonmarketing expertise is somewhat of an opportunity cost for marketing expertise, at least, in rel ative terms. Here, more organization instability, more competition, and larger organization size require more nonmarketing expertise to better manage the organiza tion.
Empirical Analysis
The previous section formulates hypotheses that predict how specific factors should influence the value of mar keting expertise. For example, we predict that as market presence (e.g., measured in sales) increases, the value of marketing expertise should increase because the po tential loss from a marketing mistake increases.
This section tests our hypotheses. We start by devel oping measures for marketing expertise. These mea sures become our dependent variables. Our model pre dicts how specific variables (e.g., new products, market share, competition, sales, etc.) should influence the value of marketing expertise. These firm and market variables become our independent variables that we use to predict the need for marketing expertise. Hence, we predict which firms should have more marketing ex pertise from our independent variables. Our goal is to learn whether we can actually predict which firms in vestment more in marketing expertise.
Our analysis uses the previously developed mea sures. We again emphasize that additional measures are possible for our underlying factors. Many of these ad ditional measures, however, should be highly corre lated with the measures we adopt.
We start by describing our data base. Next, we de scribe our dependent and independent variables. Fi nally, we estimate the relationships between our depen dent and independent variables. (Kinnear and Root 1990) . It follows that our measures are objec tive and the results of our study can be easily replicated.
The Data
Our data base included the firms listed in Forbes Top 800 Executives {Forbes, May 28,1990). We include only established companies in our sample. Missing infor mation forced deletion of several companies. We were left with 592 companies belonging to 53 different in dustries, as classified by Forbes {Forbes, April 30, 1990). These classifications place each firm in a single primary industry.
Our goal is to identify both firm and market factors, so our variables are at both the firm level (e.g., assets) and industry level (e.g., intensity of competition). These variables are either dependent or independent. Our de pendent variables describe the value a firm places on marketing expertise. Our independent variables should explain whether a firm places high value on marketing expertise.
Dependent Variables
We used multiple measures for the value of marketing expertise to capture its different aspects. Our measures are percent of sales spent on marketing research and Chief Executive Officer's (CEO) professional back ground. These measures should be sufficiently distinct to test our underlying theory.
We assume that firms' spending levels, on various marketing activities, reflect the firms' perceived impor tance of those activities. For example, firms that spend a larger portion of their sales on marketing research per ceive marketing research as more important than do firms spending a smaller portion. Of course, this as sumption may be a poor approximation when a firm faces severe financial constraints. That firm may be un able to do market research despite the importance the firm places on marketing research. Here, although our model is correct, our empirical analysis might not detect significant relationships.
Section 3 states that if there exists a resource con straint on total expertise (marketing plus nonmarket ing), then increasing nonmarketing expertise requires 380 reducing marketing expertise. The constraint is obvi ously binding for CEO's background-there can be only one CEO. For marketing research effort, an overall budgetary constraint could apply to marketing and nonmarketing discretionary spending. Here, however, a binding constraint is less often applicable. Perhaps, across firms and industries, all else equal, greater im portance of nonmarketing expertise tends to imply lower discretionary spending on marketing researchthe aggregate effect requires that the constraint is bind ing for only some fraction of the firms (Associate Edi tor). Binding or not, more market research spending may suggest a greater importance placed on marketing expertise.
The following two dependent variables measure how firms perceive the value of marketing expertise.
Dependent Variable I: Percent of Sales Spent on Marketing Research.
As the EVMEU increases, firms should spend more on marketing activities, such as marketing research. It follows that the value of mar keting expertise should reflect the firm's marketing re search expenditures. We therefore used percent of sales spent on marketing research as one of our measures of the firm's perceived value of marketing expertise.
We recognize that firms use other sources for market information beyond market research studies, such as re ports from salespeople. Unfortunately, salesforce activ ities and firms' salesforce spending are highly sensitive information, and no public data sources are available on these variables. A poor measure of marketing exper tise could diminish the significance of our empirical re lationships. However, we hope market research expen ditures are highly correlated with other activities in volved with monitoring markets. Kinnear and Root (1990) report the mean market re search expenditures in 1988 for eight industry groups (consumer goods manufacturers, industrial goods man ufacturers, advertising agencies, retailing/wholesaling, financial services, health services, publishers/broad casters, and all others). Although our hypotheses are at the firm level, we use these data. Our literature review failed to identify any sources of more disaggregate in formation on market research spending. We therefore use the mean market research spending in an industry group for all the firms in that industry group. More accurate firm-level measures for this dependent vari able should provide better results. Errors in company sales might produce a bias because we used sales on both sides of the equation. However, we can reasonably assume that our measure of com pany sales is without error.
Dependent Variable II: Chief Executive
Officer's Background. The marketing literature often recommends that firms emphasize marketing expertise. However, measuring actual firm emphasis is difficult. Despite their emphasis, firms like to claim a strong mar keting emphasis (Simon and Button 1990) . We know of no firms that state they ignore the market.
Often, whether a firm is market-oriented depends on individual perspective. The firm itself may feel it heeds the market. Outside observers may disagree. Hence, we need an objective measure of a firm's emphasis. The measure should be independent of individual perspec tive.
Extensive measurement via in-depth interviews and surveys can reveal true orientation of specific compa nies. Narver and Slater (1990) use this tedious and in tricate procedure for one company. Replicating this elaborate procedure to obtain this level of detail for hun dreds of companies is virtually impossible. We require measures obtainable for hundreds of companies. Be sides being objective and practical, our measures of firm emphasis should be replicable. It should be possible for future research to replicate our analysis with different industries, different market factors, and different time periods.
Many researchers (Argysis 1965; Deshpande and Webster 1989; Dumaine 1990; Felton 1959; Levitt 1969; Webster 1988 Webster ,1981 CEO in establishing a firm's area of expertise. These re searchers suggest that the CEOs exemplify the firm's orientation. Hence, the CEO's professional background is a possible measure of both the CEO's expertise and the firm's emphasis on different areas of expertise.
To be practical, the CEO's professional background should be measurable. If the CEOs' backgrounds were often inter-disciplinary, our measure could not distin guish between different areas of expertise. Our empiri cal analysis, however, suggests that most CEOs have backgrounds in one specific discipline. Hence, CEO background is unambiguous and enables business publications to classify CEOs by background.
If the firm's CEO has a marketing background, then we say the firm perceives marketing expertise as very valuable. We doubt that a marketing CEO alone causes a firm to cherish marketing expertise. We also doubt that firms placing a high value on marketing expertise always have marketing CEOs. Fortunately, we require neither condition for our analysis. It is unimportant to our analysis the direction of causality. A marketing CEO may make a firm value marketing expertise, or a firm valuing marketing expertise may choose a marketing CEO. We only require that firms who, on average, have a marketing CEO place a higher value on marketing expertise. The marketing CEO may result from either the existing influence of marketing or a desire to in crease the influence of marketing.
We obtained CEO backgrounds from the Forbes Top 800 Executives (Forbes, May 28, 1990) . Forbes identifies 12 different backgrounds (marketing, sales, retailing, fi nancial, banking, investment, insurance, legal, techni cal, operations, administration, and journalism). As a cross-check, we verified CEO backgrounds with where RATIO' = the ratio variable for industry i, CEO) = the number of CEO's in group / industry i, j e {marketing, sales, retailing, total). Consumer nondurables and retailing have the highest RATIOs. These industries traditionally place a high value on marketing expertise. Aerospace and defense, oil field services, lease and finance, health care services, diversified insurance, and hotels and gaming industries have no marketing CEOs (RATIO is zero). These employment histories in WTio' s Who in America (1989) . Most backgrounds were accurate. In some cases, the Who's Who in America (1989) background was more ac curate than Forbes. Table 1 contains CEO background information. Mar keting background receives the third highest compen sation behind administration and investment back grounds. Banking had the lowest paid CEOs. Marketing CEOs rank fifth in both tenure with company and ten ure as CEO. Table 2 shows the concentration of marketing CEOs (RATIO) by industry. To calculate RATIO, we grouped the first three classes of backgrounds (mar keting, sales, and retailing) together. Then we divided the number of CEOs in an industry belonging to this PA §A AND SHUGAN The Value of Marketing Expertise industries usually emphasize production and opera tions more than marketing.
Our dependent variable, CEO background, is a dichotomous measure (1 if CEO has a marketing, sales or retailing background; 0 otherwise). It is the probability of a firm having a marketing CEO. Table 3 summarizes our dependent variables.
Independent Variables
Firm and market variables in this group represent var ious dimensions of market instability, the profit impact of marketing decisions, and the potential loss from mar keting mistakes. These variables differ by firm and in dustry. Note that our goal is to identify firm and market factors that have an impact on the value of marketing expertise, not to identify industries per se. Data sources for these variables include Business Week (January 8, 1990) , Forbes (May 1, 1989; January 8, 1990; April 30, 1990) , Fortune (December 4,1989 -April 23,1990 , Mar keting News (May 14,1990) , and the Almanac of Business and Industrial Financial Ratios (Troy 1990) . Table 4 lists the independent variables in our final analysis. For each independent variable, Table 4 shows the underlying factor, our definition and the specific measure we used in our empirical analyses.
Hypotheses Tests
Our goal is to identify firm and market conditions that make marketing expertise more valuable to a firm. In other words, our goal is to identify when marketing ex pertise is more important than other expertise.
To test our hypothesized relationships, we regress our expertise variables (Market Research Spending as Percent of Sales and CEO Background) on the variables in Table 4 . We use a multiple regression model for our first dependent variable and a simple logit model for the second. Table 5 and Table 6 provide our results. port for our hypotheses. For example, the analysis showed that marketing expertise is more valuable for firms with high sales in industries with many new prod uct introductions, while it is less valuable in more com petitive industries with high entry. Table 5 shows the logit analysis of marketing exper tise (measured by CEO background) on our indepen dent variables. The analysis produced a log-likelihood of -247.96 and a hit ratio (n = 592) of 82.8%. We also see that four of our eight firm and market variables (New Products, Employee Change, Intensity of Com petition, and Assets) were significant at least at the 0.10 level. Table 7 summarizes our findings. The empirical anal yses provide support for our hypotheses. We find that market advantage, competitive entry, and market pres ence (for CEO background), and organization size (for marketing research spending) do not significantly affect marketing expertise. However, we find that market in stability, organization instability, and intensity of com petition significantly affect a firm's investment in mar keting expertise (both marketing research spending and CEO background).
Greater market instability and market presence (for marketing research spending) increase the value of mar keting expertise while higher organization instability, larger organization size (for CEO background) and competition decrease the value of marketing expertise.
It is surprising that as competition increases, the value of marketing expertise decreases. This finding contradicts the relationship hypothesized by Kohli and Jaworski (1990) . It is consistent with some conclusions of the DEFENDER model (Hauser and Shugan 1983) . As competition increases, the firm's potential profits de crease, and the firm responds by decreasing its market ing expenditures. Marketing expertise is more valuable when there are many possible strategies and some gen erate high profits. The negative effect of competition on the value of marketing expertise appears strong. This suggests a fal lacy in the general perception that recently unregulated firms (e.g., banks) have become more market-oriented after deregulation (Pare 1990 ) due to increased compe tition. These firms may have increased their invest ments in marketing expertise after deregulation. How ever, our findings suggest increased competition did not cause of these increased investments. Our findings sug gest that deregulation creates turbulent markets and that turbulence enhances the value of marketing exper tise. Our findings also suggest other possible factorssuch as increased market instability due to many new product introductions-that may have caused firms to increase their emphasis on marketing after deregula tion. As Pare (1990) reports, banks have been offering many new products and services, mainly through bun dling, in an attempt to win more consumer trade. Hence, in addition to being consistent with actual changes after deregulation, our findings also provide a better understanding of the intricate nature of the many factors that firm face.
Implications for Firms
Our study provides some guidelines about when a firm should invest in marketing expertise, and identifies some conditions under which marketing expertise is more valuable to a firm. Using our model, a firm can begin to investigate whether it should have more or less marketing expertise given the conditions it operates in. This is especially critical when the industry conditions undergo some changes. Firms should look at the impact of these changes on the potential loss from marketing mistakes, the profit impact of marketing decisions, and market instability. Different firm and market variables have different impacts. For example, when market in stability increases, due to high number of product in troductions in an industry, firms need more marketing expertise.
Future Research
Our model provides a theoretical framework for the re lationship between the expected value of marketing ex pertise and various firm and market conditions. Our empirical analyses identified several key factors that make marketing expertise more valuable to a firm. Our findings are encouraging, but many challenges remain.
Perhaps efficient and effective measurement is the biggest challenge. We realize that our findings are lim ited by the extent of our measures and our database. For example, we relied heavily on the market research spending and CEO background as our measures of the value of marketing expertise. One can argue that mar keting expertise encompasses many other activities. Our second measure, professional background of CEO, may be somewhat controversial. It would be valuable to do future work looking into different measures of these constructs. We hope that future research can build on our first attempt to quantify these constructs. We be lieve that developing and using different measures to
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capture the essence of marketing expertise will be a con tinuing challenge.
We relied on industry figures for some variables due to lack of firm level data. Exploring new data sources to represent all our factors with firm level data will im prove our confidence in the results.
Future research should analyze different cross sec tions of the data, such as firm type (e.g., industrial ver sus consumer). Any significant differences across groups can be studied. Our goal was to identify firm and market factors that have an impact on the value of marketing expertise, not to identify industries per se. However, extending our analyses to identify industries or industry groups can be valuable.
We did our analyses using U.S. industries. However, European and Asian industries may provide richer ex amples with clearer distinctions between different areas of expertise.
Future research can explore richer models. Future re search could expand our theory to more formally con sider competition, continuous probability distributions for the states in each state space, imperfect expertise, regulatory factors, supplier interactions, and different nonmarketing expertise. Dynamic extensions might provide insights on learning and signaling in a com petitive environment. It also would be interesting to un cover the relationship between channel instability (Coughlan and Wernerfelt 1989) and the need for mar keting expertise.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper had three objectives: (1) to construct a theo retical model that aids in evaluating marketing exper tise, (2) to use that theoretical model to identify factors influencing the value of marketing expertise, and (3) to empirically test the model.
To accomplish the first objective, we use a decisiontheoretic model where firms must choose strategies. The true state-of-the-world determines the profit of a strat egy. Expertise identifies the true state-of-the-world. The difference in expected profit between decisions made with and without expertise determines the expected value of expertise.
Using a decision-theoretic model, we calculated the expected value of marketing expertise. Our theoretical 386 model provided the following three factors influencing the expected value of marketing expertise: (1) the insta bility of the marketing environment, (2) the profit im pact of marketing decisions, and (3) the potential loss from marketing mistakes.
An empirical analysis helped accomplish our third objective. We identified some conditions under which marketing expertise is more valuable to a firm. Greater market instability and market presence (for marketing research spending) increase value of marketing exper tise, while higher organization instability, larger orga nization size (for CEO background), and competition decrease the value of marketing expertise.
In formulating strategies for new products, market research, promotion, sales force, advertising, and other activities, the firm must first consider the role of mar keting in the complete situation of the firm. Webster (1981) and Day and Wind (1980) note that marketing academicians have been preoccupied by tactical deci sions rather than investigating important strategic is sues. Researchers now realize that a market expertise and a market orientation may not always be best (Kohli and Jaworski 1990, Houston 1986 ). Identifying when marketing expertise is valuable for a firm has prominent consequences. This study provides a theoretical and empirical model for tackling the problem. In sum, this research reinforces the emerging view that the firm and market factors have an influence on the value of mar keting expertise.
Like other researchers (Kohli and Jaworski 1990, Houston 1986 ), we argue that marketing expertise may not be the most valuable type of expertise for all firms in all industries. By identifying both theoretically and empirically the conditions under which marketing ex pertise is more valuable to a firm, we provide a theo retical and empirical model for contrasting the impor tance of marketing relative to other disciplines. 12 12 We are grateful to Jehoshua Eliashberg, the Departmental Editor of Marketing, the Associate Editor and four anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions. We also thank Gordon Antelman, Mark Bergen, Harry Davis, Shantanu Dutta, Kristiaan Helsen, Abel Jeuland, Mary Sullivan, Osman Zaim, and all Chicago Workshop participants for their valuable comments. The first author is indebted to the Marketing Science Institute for financial assistance via the Alden G. Clayton Award.
